OPINIONS: The Mishnah states that if a person neglects his fire and it leaps over a fence four Amos high, he is exempt from the resulting damages. He is also exempt if it leaps over a "Derech ha'Rabim" (a "public path") or river.

The Gemara asks, "Who is the Tana of the Mishnah?" Rava answers, "Rebbi Eliezer, who says that [one is exempt for damages when his fire travels] sixteen Amos, the minimum width of a Derech ha'Rabim."

Why does the Gemara have a question, and what is special about Rava's answer? It seems obvious that Rebbi Eliezer of the next Mishnah (61b) is the Tana of this Mishnah, as he says there the exact same thing that the Mishnah here says.

(a) TOSFOS (DH Derech ha'Rabim) answers that it is necessary for Rava to teach that the Mishnah follows the view of Rebbi Eliezer in order to classify these Mishnayos as "Stam v'Achar Kach Machlokes," a Mishnah which contains no dispute that is followed by a Mishnah which contains a dispute about the previous matter. This classification is important because whenever the Mishnayos appear in such an order, the Halachah does not follow the Stam Mishnah (see Gemara later, 102a).

(b) The MAHARSHAL quotes a text in which the Girsa is not "d'Tenan" but "d'Tanya," which implies that the Gemara does not refer to Rebbi Eliezer in the Mishnah, but to Rebbi Eliezer in a Beraisa. This is supported by the wording "he is exempt" which is not found in the Mishnah. (This text is quoted in the margin of many Gemaras.)

Although the Maharshal himself discounts this opinion in light of Tosfos' explanation, the PNEI YEHOSHUA points out that there is more reason to support this text. In the following Mishnah, Rebbi Eliezer states that one is exempt in a case of a fire which jumps sixteen Amos, the width of a Derech ha'Rabim. This implies that even when the fire travels in a field with no barriers, the owner of the fire is exempt from damages within sixteen Amos. On the other hand, the Mishnah implies that the owner is exempt only when the fire must skip over an actual Derech ha'Rabim or a river. This seems more strict than the opinion presented in the next Mishnah. These indications present a strong case that this indeed is a Beraisa. Why, then, according to Tosfos, does Rava say that the Mishnah follows the view of Rebbi Eliezer?

The Pnei Yehoshua answers as follows. Rav explains that the Mishnah refers to a case in which the fire is burning upright. If it is bent over (i.e. spreading quickly), one would be liable even for damages that it causes one hundred Mil away. The Gemara quotes a Beraisa in support of Rav's conclusion. The Beraisa adds that when the fire is bent over and there is fuel to keep it burning, a person is liable for the damages that it causes even one hundred Mil away.

The Pnei Yehoshua points out that since both Rav and the Beraisa do not mention whether fuel is present or not as a factor in a fire that is burning upright, it is clear that it makes no difference. The Gemara therefore understands that Rebbi Eliezer does not differentiate between a fire that is burning upright and a fire that has a Derech ha'Rabim or river to navigate. Both are expected to travel less than sixteen Amos.

The Gemara's deduction (Rava's answer) is clear according to Shmuel. Shmuel understands that the Mishnah refers to a fire that is bent over, yet he also maintains that this fire will not travel more than sixteen Amos, and the wood around it will not help it go farther. According to Shmuel, no ordinary fire (either upright or bent over) is expected to travel more than sixteen Amos. It is clear that the consecutive Mishnayos are discussing the same fire, as opposed to the Beraisa, in which it is not clear what type of fire is being discussed and what the Tana of the Beraisa would rule in the case of the fires discussed by the Gemara. This is why it is logical to assume that the Gemara indeed quotes Rebbi Eliezer's statement from the next Mishnah and not from an anonymous Beraisa. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)

OPINIONS: Rava explains that Rebbi Yehudah and the Chachamim in the Mishnah argue about two points. In the first part of the Mishnah they argue about whether one is obligated to pay for "Tamun b'Esh," damage done by one's fire to objects that were covered and hidden. They also argue about the law in the case of one who lights a fire in his neighbor's field, where everyone agrees that there is no exemption of "Tamun b'Esh." However, if what was hidden was not expected to be there, the Chachamim exempt the one who lit the fire, while Rebbi Yehudah obligates him to pay for the damages.

In the second argument, the Chachamim's position is difficult to understand. A special exemption is needed to teach that when one lights a fire he is exempt from paying for damages of "Tamun." Since this exemption does not apply when he lights the fire in someone else's field, why do the Chachamim exempt the one who lights the fire when an object was not expected to be "Tamun" there?

(a) TOSFOS (end of DH Ela Amar Rava) explains that the Chachamim indeed exempt the person for "Tamun" only when he lights the fire in his field. When he lights the fire in someone else's field, he is liable for damages to things that are expected to be "Tamun." It is logical, however, that he is exempt from things that are not expected to be "Tamun"; he is not expected to assume that the owner of the field hides his wallet under a pile of grain.

The RAMBAN (in Milchamos) has difficulty with Tosfos. With regard to no other category of damage is a person not expected to assume that something was hidden inside an item that he damaged, such that he should be exempt from paying for it. According to Tosfos, he should be exempt because of logic.

(b) The RAMBAN therefore learns the Gemara here in a completely different manner. He explains that Rebbi Yehudah and the Chachamim argue about a case in which there are no witnesses to testify about what was burned underneath the grain. The victim of the damage claims that he had certain items hidden under the grain which were destroyed by the fire, but he has no witnesses. Rebbi Yehudah says that the victim is believed, even if it is not common for a person to store such items there. The Chachamim rule that he is believed only when he claims payment for items that normally are stored in such a place. (The reason for liability in such a case is "Takanas Nigzal"; see 62a.) If he claims payment for items not normally stored there, such as a wallet, the person who lit the fire does not have to pay. However, both Rebbi Yehudah and the Chachamim agree that when there are witnesses who testify that a wallet under the grain was burned by the fire, the person who lit the fire must pay.

(c) The YAM SHEL SHLOMO (#32) gives a similar explanation to that of Tosfos, but he adds a point which answers the question of the Ramban. He explains that although there indeed is no exemption for directly damaging things that one does not expect to be contained within the thing he damages, there is a general exemption from paying for things which one does not damage directly (but only through negligence). In this case, where the person simply did not manage his fire well, he is exempt. However, if he clearly lights the stack of grain with intent to burn it down, he indeed is obligated to pay for anything hidden that is burned. (See also SHACH CM 418:7, and ARUCH HA'SHULCHAN CM 418:11.) (Y. Montrose)