1)

(a)We cannot learn Shmuel's Din ('Ra'uhu she'Ratz Achareihen') from our Mishnah, which begins its definition of Shevu'as ha'Eidus with the words 'Amar li'Shenayim "Bo'u ve'He'iduni!" ', implying that Ratz Achareihem is not sufficient - because it is possible that 'Amar' is 'La'av Davka' (not specifically required).

(b)We learn from "ve'Kichesh ba'Amiso" (written in Vayikra in connection with Shevu'as ha'Pikadon) that - Shevu'as ha'Pikadon does not require 'Amar' (like Shevu'as ha'Eidus does).

(c)Bearing in mind that the first Mishnah in the next Perek begins the definition of 'Shevu'as ha'Pikadon' with 'Amar lo "Ten li Pikadon she'Yesh li be'Yad'cha!" ', this proves that - 'Amar' is La'av Davka.

2)

(a)Saying 'La'av Davka' in both Mishnah's nevertheless poses a Kashya on Sh'muel - because if it not necessary, why did Rebbi insert it?

(b)There would be no problem with the Mishnah in Shevu'as ha'Pikadon if 'Amar' in this Perek came to preclude 'Ratz Achareihem' (not like Shmuel) - because then we could always say that the Tana wrote 'Amar' by Shevu'as ha'Pikadon because it needed to write it by Shevu'as ha'Eidus.

(c)We answer that Rebbi inserted it in 'Shevu'as ha'Pikadon' - because it is more common.

(d)We cite a Beraisa in support of Sh'muel - which invalidates a Shevu'as ha'Eidus where the witnesses open the dialogue, when they perceive the litigant chasing them, and which concludes 've'Im be'Pikadon, Chayav'.

3)

(a)Our Mishnah invalidates a Shevu'as ha'Eidus that the witnesses denied outside Beis-Din. Abaye learns this from the Pasuk "Im Lo Yagid ve'Nasa Avono" - which implies that the denial must take place in a location where their Hagadas Eidus (testimony) would be valid.

(b)When Rav Papa then asked Abaye why we do not also invalidate the Shevu'ah itself, when it is made outside Beis-Din, he answered based on the Beraisa "le'Achas", 'le'Chayav Al Kol Achas ve'Achas', by which the Tana means that - if the litigant mentioned five Shevu'os, then the witnesses are Chayav five Korbanos.

(c)This D'rashah answers Rav Papa's Kashya - inasmuch as it can only pertain to a Shevu'ah that the litigant forces the witnesses to make outside Beis-Din (because inside Beis-Din, we will exempt them on all but the first Shevu'ah (due to the principle 'Keivan she'Higid, Shuv Eino Chozer u'Magid, as we explained in the Mishnah).

4)

(a)We learned in our Mishnah that if the two witnesses deny the Shevu'ah simultaneously, they are both Chayav. The problem with this is - the principle 'I Efshar Le'tzamtzem' (meaning that it is not possible for two people to begin something at exactly the same moment (in which case one of the two must have preceded the other).

(b)Rav Chisda establishes the author of our Mishnah as Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili, who holds 'Efshar Letzamtaem'. Rebbi Yochanan establishes it even like the Rabbanan, and it speaks where - he requires the second witness to deny knowledge of the testimony 'Toch K'dei Dibur' of the first one.

(c)We establish 'Toch K'dei Dibur' either as ...

1. ... 'K'dei She'eilas Talmid le'Rav' - 'Shalom alecha Rebbi [others add the word 'u'Mori']) or as ...

2. ... 'K'dei Rav le'Talmid' - 'Shalom Alecha' (though this text seems to have been inserted in error).

(d)We reconcile this explanation with the fact that 'Shevu'ah she'Ein Anu Yod'im Lecha Eidus' said by two people will inevitably take longer than 'Toch K'dei Dibur' - by requiring the second witness to begin his denial 'Toch K'dei Dibur' of the first (and not that he must conclude his testimony 'Toch K'dei Dibur' from the beginning of his co-witness).

5)

(a)We establish our Mishnah, which exempts the second witness from Shevu'as ha'Eidus, should he testify after 'Toch K'dei Dibur', like the Tana Kama of Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon, who hold that - a single witness is not subject to Shevu'as ha'Eidus.

(b)Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon says that he is 'Chayav'. Initially, we establish the basis of their Machlokes as - whether a single witness comes to make the defendant swear (the Tana Kama [consequently, his denial is not Chashuv]), or to make him pay (Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon).

(c)The Tana Kama Darshens the Pasuk in Shoftim "Lo Yakum Eid Echad le'Chol Avon u'le'Chol Chatas", 'Aval Kam Hu li'Shevuah'. Rebbi Shimon will Darshen it - "Lo Yakum Eid Echad le'Chol Avon u'le'Chol Chatas" 'Aval Kam Hu le'Mamon'.

(d)Based on a statement of Abaye, which we are about to discuss, we conclude that even according to Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon, one witness comes to obligate the defendant to swear, and the reason that he obligates him to bring a Korban if he denies the claim is - because he holds 'Davar he'Gorem le'Mamon, ke'Mamon Dami' (like his father) ...

(e)... whereas the Tana Kama holds 'Davar he'Gorem le'Mamon, La'av ke'Mamon Dami']).

6)

(a)When Abaye said (with regard to Shevu'as ha'Eidus) 'ha'Kol Modim ...

1. ... be'Eid Sotah she'Chayav', he meant - an Eid Tum'ah (one witness who saw the Sotah actually sinning), in which case, even the Tana Kama will agree that he will be Chayav a Korban, should he deny having witnessed it - because the Torah believes one witness to cause the woman to lose her Kesuvah.

2. ... be'Eidei Sotah she'Patur', he meant - two Eidei Kinuy (two witnesses who witnessed the husband warning his wife not to seclude herself with P'loni), in which case even Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon will agree that they will be Patur - because it is it only a 'Gorem de'Gorem' (meaning that even if the witnesses would testify, it will still require Eidei S'tirah (who saw her seclude with the man forbidden by her husband) as well her refusal to drink the Mei Sotah, before she will lose her Kesuvah.

(b)The case in which the Tana Kama and Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon then argue is - that of 'Eidei S'tirah' who swear, where Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon obligates the witnesses to bring a Korban, because it is a 'Davar ha'Gorem le'Mamon' (as we explained), and the Rabbanan say 'Patur'.

7)

(a)When Abaye continue 'ha'Kol Modim be'she'Kenegdo Chashud al ha'Shevu'ah', he cannot be referring to a regular case where the borrower is suspect - because that would be another case of 'Gorem le'Mamon (since the claimant may not want to swear), in which case the Rabbanan would argue with Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon (and Abaye would not have said 'ha'Kol Modim').

(b)He must therefore be referring to a case - where both litigants are disqualified from swearing, and which is a clear-cut case, because the Shevu'ah lands on the one whom the Torah obligates to pay, and since he cannot swear, he is obligated min ha'Torah to pay. Consequently, this is a case of Mamon (and not Gorem le'Mamon), and should the witness deny knowledge of the testimony, he will be Chayav a Korban.

(c)And when Abaye continues 'ha'Kol Modim be'Eid Echad de'Rebbi Aba' ('Naska de'Rav Aba'), he is referring to a case where one witness testified that Reuven grabbed a lump of silver from Shimon - a claim to which Reuven confesses, but adds that the lump of silver belonged to him in the first place.

(d)The problem is that - whereas under normal circumstances, Reuven would have to swear that he did not grab it, in order to be exempt from having to pay, in this case, where he admitted to having grabbed it, what must he swear?

8)

(a)Rebbi Ami's dilemma was that - on the one hand, lacking two witnesses, he could not obligate Reuven to pay, whilst on the other, he could not exempt him completely, since there was one witness who required a Shevu'ah.

(b)Neither could the defendant swear, because having grabbed the silver, he was in a way comparable to a Gazlan, who is not believed to swear.

(c)Nor did Rebbi Ami believe him with a 'Migu' (that he could have said that he did not grab it) - seeing as there is one witness who saw that he did.

(d)Rebbi Aba, who was sitting in front of Rebbi Ami, solved his dilemma - by sentencing him to pay, because the sole option the Torah gives the defendant is that of making a Shevu'ah to counter the claim of the witness. Failing that, he is Chayav to pay.

(e)Consequently - this too, is considered Mamon (and not Gorem le'Mamon), and should the witness deny knowledge of the testimony, he too, will be Chayav a Korban.

9)

(a)Rav Papa follows in the footsteps of Abaye. When he says 'ha'Kol Modim be'Eid Misah she'Hu ... '

1. ... Patur', he is referring to a case - where the witness informed the woman that her husband died, but did not testify before Beis-Din. And he is Patur, because, seeing as she is now believed to testify in Beis-Din herself (as we learned in the Mishnah in Yevamos), he has not caused her a loss.

2. ... Chayav' - he is referring to a case where he testified neither to her nor before Beis-Din (because then he has caused her a loss).

(b)In spite of the fact that a woman's basic claim on her Kesuvah is Karka, this does not necessarily mean that Rav Papa holds 'Mashbi'a Eidei Karka, Chayav' (involving a major Machlokes later in 'Shevu'as ha'Pikadon') - because he could be speaking in a case where the husband put away Metaltelin for his wife's Kesuvah.

10)

(a)The problem with our Mishnah presenting first the case of 'Kafru Sh'neihen be'Zeh Achar Zeh, ha'Rishon Chayav ... ' and then 'Kafar Echad ve'Hodeh Echad, ha'Kofer Chayav' is - why the Tana needs to add the latter case, because, if the first witness is Chayav even where the second witness too, denies (and where he could argue that his denial made no difference to the litigant), then he should certainly be Chayav in the Seifa, where the second witness admitted, and where his own denial makes that much of a difference.

(b)To answer the Kashya, we establish the Seifa when the second witness initially denied knowledge of the testimony together with the first one, and the Chidush, which now affects the Seifa, is that - we hold 'Toch K'dei Dibur ke'Dibur Dami', thereby enabling him to retract.

(c)According to Rav Chisda, who established the Reisha ('Kafru Sh'neihen ke'Achas') like Rebbi Yossi yha'Gelili, the Reisha teaches us 'Efshar Letzamtzem', and the Seifa 'Toch K'dei Dibur'. The problem, according to Rebbi Yochanan, who learns the Chidush in the Reisha as 'Toch K'dei Dibur ke'Dibur Dami' is - why the Tana needs to teach us the same Chidush twice.

(d)We solve the problem according to Rebbi Yochanan too, by pointing out that - the Tana needs two Mishnahs to teach us two different types of 'Toch K'dei Dibur': one, to combine the testimony of the second witness with that of the first; the other, that a witness is able to retract from his original testimony 'Toch K'dei Dibur'.

11)

(a)In the Mishnah's final case (of two pairs of witnesses), the second pair is clearly Chayav, since the first pair have already denied knowledge of the testimony. The problem with the Mishnah's ruling, obligating the first pair too, is - why they should be Chayav, seeing as the second pair has not yet retracted from the testimony, in which case, the denial of the first pair will not cause the claimant a loss.

(b)To answer the Kashya, we establish the Mishnah - where the second pair of witnesses are related to the first pair via their wives, who are 'Gos'sin' (dangerously ill) at the time that the first pair testify.

(c)The Chidush is that - even though the majority of Gos'sin die, we do not follow the majority when it comes to money matters, and we therefore consider it is as if the first pair of witnesses is the only pair.