When is "mi'Machoras" referring to?
Rashi: It refers to the day after Yom Kipur, when Moshe descended Har Sinai with the second Luchos. It cannot refer to an earlier date, since, before Matan Torah there were no "Chukei Elokim v'Es Torosav" (18:16) to teach them. Then from the time that the Torah was given until Yom Kipur, Moshe did not "sit down to judge the people" - seeing as he descended Har Sinai on the seventeenth of Tamuz, broke the Luchos and ascended again in the early morning of the eighteenth, 1 finally returning only on Yom Kipur. 2
Ramban and Targum Onkelos: It refers to the day after the events of the previous Parshah. 3
Rashbam: It could have been even if Yisro came before Matan Torah, 4 since they always had a system of civil laws, and besides, they were taught Dinei Mamonos at Marah! 5
But Rashi to Shemos 33:11 writes that Moshe ascended only on the nineteenth of Tamuz; see Sifsei Chachamim there.
See Oznayim la'Torah, who strongly queries Rashi, and, citing the Ha'amek Davar who cites the Ba'al ha'Turim ha'Aroch, explains that there is a printing mistake in Rashi, which ought to read, not "mi'Mochoras Yom ha'Kipurim,' but 'mi'Mochoras Yom Kaparah' - the day after they brought the Korbanos.
Irrespective of when Yisro arrived; refer to 18:12:2:2 . And when the Mechilta explains the day after Yom Kipur (which the Torah does not mention here), it means that it must have taken place after Yom Kipur and not before - even assuming that they kept Yom Kipur before it was given at Har Sinai - since, before then, Moshe did not have a full day on which he could possibly have judged (see Ramban).
The Rashbam concludes however that, for other reasons, it is more likely that Yisro came after Matan Torah.
Moshav Zekenim (to 18:18, citing R. Aharon): At Marah they were commanded generally about Dinim, but they were not given the details until Matan Torah.
When did this interaction between Yisro and Moshe take place?
Rashi: Even if Yisro came before Matan Torah, 1 this Parshah can only have been said in the second year; 2 since, after Moshe sent Yisro away (in Pasuk 27), we do not find that he returned. 3 Yet the Torah records that, when they departed from Har Sinai in the second year, Yisro was still with them, as the Torah records in Bamidbar 10:29-32. 4
Rosh (to 18:4): Moshe was judging the Bnei Yisrael even prior to Matan Torah, 5 based on the Mitzvos that they received at Marah, which included monetary laws.
... And the preceding section, Yisro's arrival, is indeed in chronological order.
Riva: Perhaps Moshe sent Yisro home after Yom Kipur; the years are counted from Tishrei, so it is the second year. Or perhaps, the years are counted from Nisan, and the entire Parshah took place in the first year -- except for the last Pasuk when he is sent home, which took place in the second year.
Ramban in 18:1 answers that Yisro left to convert his family, and then returned.
What is the significance of the fact that the Torah writes, "va'Yeishev Moshe ...," but "va'Ya'amod ha'Am"?
Shevu'os 30b: To teach us that while judging, the Dayanim sit, whereas the litigants must stand. 1
If so, why did Yisro protest? See 18:13:2.2:1 .
Assuming this was the day after Moshe returned with the Luchos, and he was obligated to instruct the people about building the Mishkan (Sifsei Chachamim), how could he sit "from morning until evening" in judgment? Moreover, when would he then study Torah?
Rashi: The Torah means, not literally that he sat from morning until evening, but that a Dayan who judges correctly, it is as if he studied Torah all day, and as if he was a partner with Ha'Kadosh-Baruch-Hu in the Creation, about which the Torah writes "va'Yehi Erev, va'Yehi Voker." 1
Ramban, Seforno, Targum Onkelos and Targum Yonasan: Moshe actually sat all (or most of the) day judging the people.
It is not however, clear, if the Pasuk is not to be taken literally, what Yisro was objecting to? See Oznayim la'Torah who discusses this point.
Moshe decided independently to separate from his wife, and Hashem concurred, telling him "v'Atah Poh Amod Imadi" (Devarim 5:28 - see Shabbos 87a). But according to the opinion that Yisro came after Matan Torah (Zevachim 116a, and see 18:1:7), Tziporah was not yet even there!
Moshav Zekenim: Moshe had already decided to separate and make a separate tent for her, even though she was in Midyan at the time.
According to the opinion that Yisro came after Matan Torah, were Moshe's sons not present at Matan Torah? It says about them "Rabu l'Ma'lah" (Divrei Hayamim I 23:17)! Also in the context of the Egel, it says "Heref Mimeni... v'E'eseh Osecha l'Goy Atzum" (Devarim 9:14)?
Moshav Zekenim: Indeed these sources support the opinion that Yisro came before Matan Torah; and "mi'Machoras" refers to the day after he brought the Korban that a convert is obligated to bring. 1
His question was based on Berachos 7b, which says that Hashem fulfilled his offer to make a great nation from Moshe, even though the threat to destroy Yisrael was not fulfilled. (PF)
QUESTIONS ON RASHI
Rashi writes: "It was on the next day (mi'Macharas) - [The day this took place] was the day after Yom ha'Kipurim -- so we learn in the Sifrei. And what is meant by 'Macharas'? The day after [Moshe's] descent from the mountain." Why not simply explain that "Macharas" means 'the next day after Yom Kippur' - as Rashi began his comments?
Gur Aryeh: Yom Kippur is not explicitly mentioned in the text; so the Pasuk cannot refer to it just as 'Machar' without specifying. But Moshe's descent from the mountain is self-understood, even without being written explicitly. Our Pasuk tells us that Moshe sat down to judge the people; he must have done so on the next day he possibly could -- right after he came down from the mountain. 1
In other words, "Macharas" is a preposition. It must be modifying an event that is evident from the text of this very Pasuk.
Rashi writes: "And what is meant by 'the next day'? The day after his descent from the mountain." Why not explain that it was the day following the events of the previous Pasuk - i.e., the meal held in honor of Yisro's arrival?
Gur Aryeh: (The Tana'im dispute whether Yisro arrived before or after Matan Torah; see Zevachim 116a. 1 ) If Yisro first arrived prior to Matan Torah, this section cannot have taken place on the day following his arrival! Moshe responds to Yisro that his function is to "inform the people of Hashem's Chukim and His Torah" (18:16); meaning that this conversation must have happened after Matan Torah. Furthermore, had Yisro arrived long after Matan Torah - i.e., well after Moshe's descent from Har Sinai - Yisro could not claim "you will surely become worn out" (18:18), as Moshe would have been judging Yisrael for a while already, with no ill-effects! Even if we propose that Yisro arrived immediately after Moshe's descent, that is not mentioned in the text, such that the Pasuk cannot refer to it simply as "Macharas." 2 Rather, Rashi explains that "Macharas" must mean that as soon as it was possible, right after his descent from the mountain, Moshe sat in judgement. 3
See the preceding question (18:13:1.1:1 ).
Gur Aryeh: Furthermore, there is no logical association between the meal in honor of Yisro, and Moshe sitting in judgment. The Torah would have no need to point out that it happened immediately afterwards.
Rashi writes: "It was the day after Yom ha'Kipurim... and what is meant by 'the next day'? The day after Moshe's descent from the mountain." Ramban asks - But if so, then [assuming the Pesukim are in chronological order,] the meal described in the preceding Pasuk took place - on Yom Kippur!
Mizrachi #1: If we find that when Shlomo dedicated the first Beis Hamikdash, Klal Yisrael ate on Yom Kippur (Moed Katan 9a), how much more so on the [joyous] day that Moshe brought down the Torah!
Mizrachi #2: Bnei Yisrael only received the Mitzvos in general, upon Moshe's descent that day. That year, they did not fast.
Gur Aryeh: Yom Kippur was made into a day of atonement, to commemorate that very day - when Moshe brought down the Torah, and Hashem was re-appeased regarding Bnei Yisrael. Yom Kippur was only established the following year. 1
Refer to 18:12:2:2, 18:12:2:4, 18:13:1:1**, and 18:13:1:2.
Yet, as above (18:13:1.2:1), Gur Aryeh himself is of the opinion that the meal held in Pasuk 12, and Moshe's judging the people in Pasuk 13, need not have taken place on consecutive days.
Rashi writes: "This section is not recorded in [chronological] order... Even according to the view that Yisro arrived prior to Matan Torah, his return to his [own] land did not take place until the second year...." What point is Rashi adding here?
Gur Aryeh 1 : Rashi means that even without the points listed above, 2 we cannot say that this section is in order. This section (beginning with our Pasuk, "It was on the next day, etc.") could not have taken place any earlier than the second year, 3 seeing as Moshe did not have any time to judge the people between Matan Torah and Yom Kipur. Even according to the opinion that Yisro arrived prior to Matan Torah, 4 since Yisro's return home (18:27) is clearly out of chronological order, we can say the same for this section as well. 5
Gur Aryeh punctuates Rashi, such that the phrase, "Even according to the view that Yisro arrived prior to Matan Torah," is the beginning a new point (rather than the conclusion of the previous one). To summarize, then, Rashi presents three proofs that this section does not follow chronological order; a. Moshe could not have taught the nation "the Chukim and the Torah," prior to Matan Torah. b. Moshe had no chance to judge the people between Matan Torah and after Yom Kippur. c. Yisro left for home only long afterwards. Gur Aryeh understands that proof b) is directed at the opinion that Yisro arrived after Matan Torah. (Had he arrived before, he could conceivably have judged them even then, based on the laws given at Marah, as below). It is proof c) that is directed at the opinion that Yisro arrived prior to Matan Torah. Gur Aryeh prefers adding the word "And [even according to the view...]," making it clear that this is a new point; but even without the word "and," it must mean as explained above.
I.e., that Moshe could not have taught the nation the Chukim and Torah, prior to Matan Torah.
I.e., the day following Yom Kipur, which is already the next year (counting from Tishrei).
Gur Aryeh: We may ask that if Yisro arrived only after Matan Torah, then it goes without saying that this entire section is out of order - seeing as Matan Torah is written only later in the Parshah! Gur Aryeh answers - Even if Yisro finally arrived much later, his arrival began with what he heard - "Va'Yishma Yisro" - about the splitting of the sea, and the war of Amalek" (Rashi to 18:1). He heard of these events prior to Matan Torah, and as such, that is when the Torah records the entire account, in topical progression. It is only this new section, about Moshe judging the people (which must have happened only after Matan Torah), comprises a new matter that is recorded out of order.
This, rather than being forced to say that this section was also prior to Matan Torah, and that "the Chukim and Torahs" (18:16) refer to those Chukim commanded at Marah.
Rashi writes: "Yisro's return to his land did not take place until the second year... as we find by the travel of the encampments (Bamidbar 10:29). Had [our section] been [in order, i.e. that he left] prior to Matan Torah, where do we find that he returned after having left!?" But is it impossible that this is what occurred, simply because it is not recorded in the Torah?
Mizrachi: Had Yisro returned a second time, it would have been even a greater Kidush Hashem. The first time, one could say he came only to bring Tziporah and her children. His second visit, however, would have been along with all of his household, just for the sake of accompanying Bnei Yisrael. As such, the Torah would have mentioned his arrival.
Gur Aryeh: It is not the Torah's way to mention Yisro's departure in this Perek, then mention his presence again in Sefer Bamidbar, without explaining that he returned in the interim. 1 (Rather, he remained with Bnei Yisrael throughout.) 2
Gur Aryeh: That is the very reason why in Pasuk 18:2 above, the Torah must mention that Tziporah had been sent home. Otherwise, we would ask that if she accompanied Moshe to Mitzrayim in Parshas Shemos, when did she return to Yisro's home? We see that the Torah usually clarifies the events in such cases.
Yet Maharal elsewhere (see 18:27:1.1:1) seems to follow Ramban (to 18:1) - that Yisro left temporarily to convert his family, and later returned in time for the first journey of Sefer Bamidbar.
Rashi writes: "Moshe sat.. and the nation stood - He sat like a king, and everyone stood. This matter was troubling to Yisro -- that he would belittle the honor of Yisrael." But to do so is in fact in accordance with the Halacha; the litigants must stand in court (see Devarim 19:17)! Furthermore, how was Moshe's response an answer to Yisro's rebuke? And besides, why must Rashi add anything to the reason that the Torah itself gives for Yisro's protest - "You will surely become worn out" (18:18)?
Gur Aryeh: Yisro initially did not imagine that all of Yisrael were coming for judgement! He thought that they were coming for advice - and particularly, regarding matters relating to the public. As such, he felt it improper that they be made to stand. When Moshe clarified that they had come for litigation, he replied that if so, "you will surely become worn out." 1
Why wouldn't Moshe have become worn out, had he merely been giving advice? It seems that Yisro was alluding to the burden and responsibility that falls on a Dayan's shoulders. See the notes to 18:13:3.1:2.
Rashi writes: "'From morning until evening' - ... Any Dayan (judge) who judges a case 'Emes la'Amito' (lit. 'truth in its trueness'), even for but one hour, the verse considers it as if he was involved in Torah-study for the entire day." Why the doubled expression, "Emes la'Amito"?
Tosfos (to Bava Basra 8b): This excludes a "Din Merumeh" (fraudulent case). 1
Gur Aryeh: "Emes la'Amito" means when the truth is clear. This excludes a case that ends in "Shuda d'Dayana" 2 - when the judge must rule based on his estimation - which might not be truth. Alternatively, when a verdict hinges upon a matter of dispute among the Sages, and the judge rules according to the accepted practice, he does not know that it is necessarily "truth." 3
Maharal (Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Ha'Din p. 186): If a Dayan does not intend to rule the truth, and still a true verdict emerges, it is not considered "Emes la'Amito."
. 2
I.e., when the judges know that the witnesses are lying - despite that this has not been proven.
There are some cases in which the verdict cannot be determined by the proofs the litigants bring; rather, the judges must make their best determination. See Kesuvos 85b, and the dispute there between Rashi and Tosfos.
In cases such as these, why is the Dayan not considered "a partner to Hashem in the work of Creation" (as Rashi continues)? See below (18:13:3.3) - Hashem created the world with Midas ha'Din, and He intended to continue running it that way (only that the world could not endure by Din alone - see Rashi to Bereishis 1:1). The value of Din is not merely in preventing fights and arguments; rather, it is the ideal direction for the world. Any sort of decision that does not clarify the truth of the matter; is not part of Hashem's original plan for running the world. (In this interpretation, Yisro is alluding to the greatness of the Dayan who presides at a Din Torah. But what relevance does this have to the simple context - the impossibility of Moshe judging the entire nation by himself, the entire day! Rather, Yisro was arguing that the difficulty would come directly from this heavy responsibility on the Dayan's shoulders.)
Rashi writes: "'From morning until evening' - ... The verse considers it as if he was involved in Torah-study the entire day." Why interpret this way? How is conducting a Din Torah relevant to the study of Torah?
Gur Aryeh #1: If a Dayan sits and judges cases the entire day, when does he learn his Torah? It must be that [a Dayan is only expected to judge for a portion of the day, and] even a case of one hour is considered as the entire day. 1 Furthermore, why should a judge who judges one case, receive the same reward as one who judges numerous cases throughout the day? Rather, the reward he will receive for even one hour of judging, is commensurate to the reward of studying Torah the entire day.
Gur Aryeh #2: Learning Torah never ends or reaches completion; our obligation is "to contemplate it day and night" (Yehoshua 1:8). Each day of learning, however, is a completion of that day's obligation; and a new Berachah of Birkas ha'Torah is required every day. Judging a Din Torah, on the other hand, is a Torah-learning activity that does have an ending and completion; hence it is tantamount to learning a complete day.
See Shabbos 10a.
Rashi writes: "'[Moshe sat to judge the people...] from morning until evening' - ...Any Dayan (judge) who judges a case 'Emes la'Amito' ... The verse considers it ... as if he becomes a partner with Hashem in the act of Creation; about which it says, 'it was evening and it was morning' (Bereishis 1:5)." How is the Dayan a partner in Creation?
Tur, Choshen Mishpat 1: The evildoers who rob and extort [the possessions of others] bring the world towards destruction. The Dayan [who brings them to justice] is upholding the world; thus partnering so to speak with the Creator, Who wants that the world should endure. 1
Gur Aryeh: Hashem initially created the world with Midas Ha'Din; that is why only the Name "Elokim" appears throughout the account of Creation (Bereishis 1:1 - 2:3; see Rashi to Bereishis 1:1). 2 Thus, the Dayan who conducts justice, is linking in to the trait with which the world was created, and partnering with Hashem. 3 The phrase "From morning until evening" alludes to the Midah that incorporates both evening and morning together. 4
Maharal (Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Ha'Din p. 186): The world was created with the Name "Elokim" (see above), indicating that it was created with Din - Hashem decreed that there should be creations. That is why a Dayan is also called "Elokim" (see Shemos 21-22), and why he is considered a partner in the act of Creation. furthermore, as opposed to the trait of Chesed, in which there are varying degrees - such that the Chesed a person does is not as great as the Chesed of Hashem - the trait of Mishpat is Emes (truth), and we cannot deem one Mishpat to be greater than another. Thus, when a Dayan judges "Emes la'Amito," he reaches the same trait of Din with which Hashem created His world!
. 2
Gur Aryeh: Even a standard Din Torah - e.g. between two neighbors or business partners, neither of which is an outright robber - has an intimidating effect on the actual robbers, who see that the courts are active and functioning, and they refrain from their crimes out of fear.
Refer to Bereishis 1:1:4:1, as well as the questions on Rashi Bereishis 1:1:4.1:1 and on.
It would seem that according to the Tur (in answer #1), the importance of Din is its prevention of destruction and fights; whereas according to Maharal in Gur Aryeh, Din has inherent significance - it is the optimal direction for the world. (EK) See Maharal (Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Ha'Din p. 185) - Hashem's existence is fundamental and of necessity, and justice is of necessity; therefore justice is dear to Hashem. Therefore, justice is granted especially to Yisrael, whose existence is likewise of necessity. Maharal (Tif'eres Yisrael Ch. 6, p. 21) - Din is "Emes and Yosher." The trait of Rachamim, on the other hand, is extended even to someone who is undeserving; thus it is not "Emes." Hashem's constant Hanhagah (direction) is the trait of Din, and with Din, Hashem created the world; it is only because the world could not endure as such, that He joined it with the trait of Rachamim. Also see Maharal (Derech Chayim p. 56, to Avos 1:18) - Din is one of three matters upon which the world endures. Hashem granted each person the right make acquisitions, and it is forbidden for anyone else to encroach on the property of his fellow. This is not merely to prevent disputes! It is true even when what actually occurred is unclear to the litigants themselves, and each presents his claim without beiong able to refute that of his opponent. Hence, the Dayan is considered a partner in Creation. Maharal (ibid. p. 57) - The three pillars of Din, Emes, and Shalom (Avos 1:18) correspond to the three realms of Creation. This lower realm of existence is the trait of Din. This realm is influenced by the luminaries and Mazalos, in a manner of Gezeiras Mishpat, as to what befalls each person. In the same way, Hashem created the world with Din, in that He decreed its existence upon the Creations, who in turn accepted His decrees and laws. When the Dayan declares his judgment upon the defendant, he is parallel to Hashem in Creation. Maharal (ibid. p. 60) - When there is justice in the world, so too Hashem decrees that it should endure (just as He created it - with Din). But in the absence of justice, Hashem does not upkeep the world by His decree.
Gur Aryeh presumably means that the morning is a time of Chesed and Divine favor, whereas the night is a time of Din and concealment. For example, see Maharal (Chidushei Agados Vol. 1, p. 42, to Shabbos 77b; Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Ha'Avodah Ch. 7, p. 97). Also see Maharal (ibid. p. 95) regarding the Halacha that requires us to mention the daytime aspect even at night (in the blessing "Ma'ariv Aravim"), and the night aspect even by day (in "Yotzer Ohr"). We must connect these two Midos and acknowledge that there are not two disparate powers, but rather the traits of Chesed and Din are guided by the same Source. It emerges that the Dayan upholds not only the trait of Din, but of Chesed as well. (Perhaps this is because the world cannot endure by the trait of Chesed alone; it is therefore Din that upholds Chesed.) (EK)
Rashi writes that a Dayan who judges correctly, it is as if he was a partner with Hashem in the Creation. But the Gemara in Mo'ed Katan 17a implies that judges are on a lower level than Chasidim?
Moshav Zekenim (to 18:14): That Gemara refers to Dayanim who are not experts. 1
Moshav Zekenim: What is the great Chochmah of judging correctly? If the judge sees that one litigant is a swindler and he lies, and the other is honest and na?ve, even if the former's claim should win, he judges according to the Emes.
